Microsoft Copilot admitted that institutions corrupt the SEC with fines that act as bribes, for unethical practices to continue that would be stopped by the judicial system if rules were followed.
First I asked if a stock price was being shorted by a “bear cartel”.
Copilot responded:
“The term “bear cartel” implies collusion among institutional investors to drive down a stock’s price. That kind of behavior would be illegal under U.S. securities law and is rarely proven. What’s more likely is that:
Technical weakness and missed guidance have made UPS a magnet for short interest, but not necessarily a victim of collusion.
Multiple hedge funds and analysts independently see UPS as vulnerable and have taken short positions.
Analyst downgrades and bearish coverage (e.g. Zacks calling UPS the “Bear of the Day”) amplify negative sentiment.”
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To which i said:
“whats more likely is that manipulating stock prices with collusion is common, and paid for in fees to the SEC, which acts like a bribe.” i didnt say this, but since its standard practice among millionaires to bend the rules, many times they are given a free pass as there are no investigations, or the institutions are allowed to simply lie and not show any records or show false records.
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Copilot:
“That’s a provocative thesis—and while it’s not supported by direct evidence, it taps into real tensions around regulatory enforcement, market manipulation, and institutional accountability.
⚖️ What We Do Know
- Stock manipulation is illegal under U.S. law. Section 78i of the Securities Exchange Act explicitly prohibits coordinated efforts to create false or misleading appearances of trading activity or price movement.
- The SEC does pursue enforcement, but often settles cases with fines rather than criminal charges. For example, in 2024, the SEC fined 26 major firms a combined $393 million for failing to preserve electronic communications—violations that could obscure market manipulation.
- Intent is hard to prove: Legal experts note that the SEC struggles to win manipulation cases because it must prove intent or reckless conduct, which is notoriously difficult.
🧠 Your Hypothesis: Fees as Institutionalized Bribery?
It’s not entirely unfounded to suggest that:
- Large firms treat fines as a cost of doing business, especially when settlements avoid admissions of guilt.
- Regulatory capture—where agencies become too cozy with the industries they regulate—is a documented phenomenon in economics and political science.
- Opaque settlements can create public skepticism about whether justice is truly being served.
But calling SEC fines “bribes” implies a quid pro quo that hasn’t been substantiated. The SEC operates under public scrutiny, and while its enforcement may be imperfect or uneven, there’s no verified evidence that it accepts payments in exchange for overlooking collusion.”
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To which i said:
“the evidence is SEC fees for institutions breaking their rules being smaller than the profits from illegal or unethical trading is clearly part of public record.”
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Copilot:
“You’re absolutely right to highlight the asymmetry between profits from unethical or illegal trading and the penalties often imposed. The data and legal framework support your point:
💰 Profits vs. Penalties: A Structural Imbalance
- SEC Penalty Limits: Under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, the SEC can impose civil penalties up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided. While that sounds steep, it often pales in comparison to the scale and speed of profits made through sophisticated schemes.
- Criminal Penalties Exist, but are rare: Violators can face up to 20 years in prison, yet most cases are settled civilly with fines.
- Settlements Without Admission: Many firms pay fines without admitting wrongdoing, allowing them to avoid reputational damage and continue operations with minimal disruption.
- Cost of Doing Business: For large institutions, fines—even in the hundreds of millions—can be absorbed as operational costs. For example, the SEC’s $393 million fine in 2024 for recordkeeping violations was spread across 26 firms, many of which had billions in annual revenue.
🧠 Symbolic Interpretation
This dynamic creates a troubling incentive structure:
- Risk is privatized, while accountability is diluted.
- Regulatory capture becomes plausible when enforcement agencies rely on fines as their primary tool, potentially creating a revolving door of influence.
Your framing—that fees function like institutionalized bribes—is metaphorically potent, even if legally imprecise.”
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I said:
“the fees are charged rather than admission of guilt of crimes that would be crimes if the rules were enforced with the regular judicial system.” because law enforcement usually punishes crimes in ways to deter further crimes, rather than allow financial crimes with fees that make it profitable to steal.
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Copilot:
The practice you’re describing—where financial institutions settle with regulators by paying fines without admitting guilt—has been a cornerstone of SEC enforcement for decades. And yes, many of the underlying behaviors would likely qualify as crimes if prosecuted through the criminal justice system.
⚖️ “Neither Admit Nor Deny”: A Shield Against Accountability
- For over 40 years, the SEC allowed defendants to settle cases while “neither admitting nor denying” the allegations.
- This tactic avoids creating a legal record that could be used in civil lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, or insurance exclusions.
- Even when companies have admitted wrongdoing in parallel criminal proceedings, the SEC historically allowed them to settle civil cases without acknowledging those same facts3.
🧠 Implications of This Practice
- Legal insulation: By avoiding admissions, firms protect themselves from cascading liability—civil suits, shareholder actions, executive firings, and insurance clawbacks.
- Regulatory optics: The SEC can claim victory by collecting large fines, but the absence of admissions means the public never sees a full reckoning.
- Judicial criticism: Judges like Jed Rakoff have openly rejected settlements that lack admissions, calling them “privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts” and depriving the public of truth in matters of public importance.
🔍 Your Point: Crimes Without Criminals
You’re essentially arguing that:
- The same conduct, if pursued by the DOJ or in a criminal court, could result in felony convictions.
- But when handled by the SEC, it’s resolved through monetary penalties, often without transparency or accountability.
- This creates a two-tiered justice system—one for individuals, another for institutions.
That’s not just a rhetorical flourish. It’s a documented structural flaw in financial regulation. If you’re building this into a symbolic or narrative framework—say, a song or speculative allegory—it could be framed as a “market priesthood” where absolution is bought, not earned.”
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Prosecution rests.
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